Our Rwanda Defence Forces, The African Peacebuilding Role Model

Beyond of their everyday duties,  RDF do different activities in line to improve people's standard of living 

The foundations of post independence Rwanda were built on legacy of utter disregard for human rights and the rule of law. Starting from 1959, thousands of innocent Batutsi were killed in the name of a revolution.  Atrocities and other gross violations of human rights organized and carried out by the government continued throughout the 1960s and 1970s.

This entrenchment of dictatorship and gross violation of fundamental human rights went hand in hand with institutionalised discrimination akin to apartheid. Access to education, employment or public service was strictly governed by quotas based on ethnicity.

The Batutsi had been reduced to second-class citizens in their own country. When 1994 came, thousands of their country men and women responded to incitement to kill them, this time with unprecedented ferocity.

The institutions of the state and public officials responsible for public order and for protecting the population turned around and organised the genocide that was unique in its barbarity, speed and scale whereby one million of Batutsi were killed in 100 days.

As the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) advanced to halt the genocide, the killers fled through the nearest border-points into the neighbouring countries of Tanzania , Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Armed and militia groups who sought refuge in the DRC reorganised to resume their genocidal campaign and complete their macabre business a little bit after RPA(now RDF) take over the territory.

Post-Genocide Military Peacebuilding 

Conflicts will continue to  be  a  reality  in Africa for  the foreseeable future, unless effective  strategies  are  employed  to ensure  security  and  stability on  the  continent.  Rwanda  has  adopted  a  peacebuilding  model  spearheaded by the military that  has  laid the foundation  in a  process  that  has  ensured stability  and  national development.

The  peacebuilding  process in the context  of  the Rwanda Defence Forces  (RDF) may  be appreciated  in  light  of  development in  post-Genocide Rwanda. The RDF integration  that preceded  the peacebuilding  was an  already  established  practice by  the Rwanda  Patriotic  Army  (RPA) during  its  struggle  for Rwandan inclusivity  and  as  a war strategy  to  weaken  the  enemy  morale.
In  the Rwandan  case,  one  method  of  reaching  lasting peace was  to  ensure  participation  by all competing factions  in  a  new  government.

Another aspect  of  ensuring  lasting  peace  was  the full  integration  of  the ex-military into the  new national  army. Thus,  the Rwanda military  integration  provided  the  example  of  an effective  peacebuilding process.

Basically there  are  three  models  of  military  integration as  conflict  management strategies:

The  first  is  the  consent-based  model,  which is  based  on  comprehensive  negotiated settlement  of  conflict between two  parties  conducted  under third  party  supervision.  The government forces may  absorb  guerrilla  forces  or may  merge the two warring  factions  to form  a  single national force.

The second  model is complete  demobilization where  the  government  decides to downsize its military  through  the  normal  channels  of  peacebuilding  but does not  include  former enemy  combatants in  its forces.  Examples  include the  1991  Ethiopia complete demobilization  of  the  former  government  forces  under the  DERG after the  defeat  of Mengistu Haille  Mariam.

The  third  is  the coercive  model  of  peacebuilding, which involves  forced  disarmament  of insurgents  and is  usually  carried  out by  external  intervention under a United  Nations mandate.  An  example  of this  is  the  failed  forced  disarmament  of  Somali  warring  factions in  1993.

The Rwandan Model  of Peacebuilding

Rwanda’s model of  peacebuilding  is  based  on  consent, where  ex-combatants were  fully integrated in  the  spirit  of  the  1993 Arusha  Peace  Agreement  between  the  RPF and  the Government  of  Rwanda.

Unlike in the  classic Consent Model, RDF  integration  was a continuous  process before,  during  and  after  cessation of  hostilities. The Rwanda  model was  effected  through the traditional  concept of Ingando.

The  Ingando  in  Kinyarwanda means  a military  encampment  or  assembly  area, where  the  troops traditionally received  their  final  briefing  while  readying  for a  military  expedition  abroad.  The  briefing included,  among others,  re-organisation of  the  troops  and  allotment  of  missions and tasks.

In such  gatherings,  the  individuals  were  reminded to  subject  their  interests to  the national ideal  and give  Rwanda  their  all.  This  meant  that  whatever  differences  one may  have,  the national interests  always  prevailed since the  nation of  Rwanda is  bigger than  any  one individual  and  ensured  prosperity for all.

The  objectives of the  Ingando  is  to  help the  participants, who today  also  include  members of  the  greater society,  i.e., students,  grassroots leaders,  opinion  leaders, teachers, released prisoners,  etc, to overcome  mutual fear and  suspicion, temptation  to  revenge; talk  about the  history  of  the  conflict; heal  the  wounds of  hatred; accept responsibility  for  any  harm done to  each other; demystify  negative  perceptions  of  each other;  collective ownership  of the  tragedy  that  resulted from   the  conflict; and agree  on  what  the future  portends  for them.

Ingando employs  the  concept  of  problem  solving  workshops (PSW),  as  a participatory conflict management  strategy. Problem-solving  workshops are  designed as  the best method  to find sustainable resolution.  PSW encourage the  parties to  analyse  their conflict,  its causes, the  parties’ attitudes towards each  other, and  their post-conflict  relationship.

Steps taken in  Ingando

The  first step was  to help  the ex-combatants and  the RDF to  unburden  themselves emotionally.  This can  be  achieved  by  allowing  them  to  talk  about  the  conflict  and  its history.

The second step was  joint military redeployment  of the former adversaries. Participation  in  Ingando recognizes  the dignity  and humanity  of  the participants  as  equal Rwandans. Irrespective of  their roles  in  the Rwandan  conflict, the  Ingando  form  the starting point  to  conflict  resolution.

Ingandos were initially  meant for  integrating  ex-combatants into  the  national army  and society  during  and after  the  Rwandan  liberation  war.  This  entailed  mixing  the  ex-FAR and  the  RPA officers. Between  1995  and  1997, a total of  10,500  ex-FAR  officers were integrated  in  the  RPA.  And between  1998 and 2002  a total  of 39,200  ex-FAR  and  militia were  integrated  in  the  RPA. 

In  the  case  of  the RDF,  the  ex-combatants moved from  being tools  of  violence  into  being  economic  assets. Peacebuilding  also becomes a  facilitator for  military  professionalism,  which  enhances  effectiveness  and healthy  civil-military  relations and  societal  reconciliation.

Rwandan Peacebuilding and  Local Ownership

Peacebuilding  demands  local  ownership,  of  which Rwanda  adopted. The following six strategies  namely:  instituting  a  campaign  plan,  establishing  coherence,  taking  the lead,  building  capacity,  Economic Assessment and Aid Focus  and Priorities and Information and  Messaging were adopted to build a successful post-Genocide Rwanda.

Campaign  Plan:  Immediate  post-genocide  Rwanda  had parameters of  a  failed  state, it was  on its death bed.  To  recap  on  these  parameters, Rwanda  was in  utter anarchy.  Over   one million  Batutsi were killed and the  rest of  the  population  were  displaced. near 3 million  people had sought  refuge  in  neighbouring  countries,  and  many  more, about  3.5 million were  internally  displaced. 

There were  countless numbers  of  orphans,  widows,  thousands of handicapped  people  and generally  a  very  vulnerable  and  traumatised population.  Law and order had  completely  broken  down. Large  scale  atrocities were  still going  on  in parts  of the  country. All  national  law enforcement agencies  and judicial  institutions had ceased  to exist and  the  system  of  administration  of justice had come  to  a complete standstill.

Social and economic  infrastructure  was in  a state  of  collapse.  All economic  indicators showed  a  desperate situation,  with  the  inflation  standing  at  close to  1000  percent,  and most  economic  activity  having  ground  to  a complete  halt.  Neither  schools  nor  hospitals  were  functioning.

The  civil service  had  been  decimated  or its membership had  fled  into exile.  A cloud  of  insecurity  loomed  over Rwanda, as the former  soldiers and  the  militia reorganised to continue their genocidal  campaign.

Given  the  above  scenario,  Rwanda’s  “campaign  plan” was  to  resuscitate  the  nation through  mobilizing  all available  resources through  the  Government  of  National  Unity. The  first strategy  was  to  own  the  process as  a  nation  through  inclusivity.

Establishing Coherence:  In Rwanda  there was  no  victor  nor  vanquished.  By  the  very  act of  genocide,  all Rwandans lost.  It  was  up  to  the  Rwandan  leadership to  turn this around and  make a  win-win  situation  for  all  in  order  to  establish  operational  coherence  at  all levels  of national  life.

This  remains  no  mean  challenge  as  the  country continues  to take stock  of  its tragedy while  trying  to heal  its  people  and usher in  peace and security to ensure the country's development.

Lead The nation: The  Rwandan took  the  lead  and  the  challenge was  to  manage  and regulate the “swarm” of  international  partners  in  form  of  International  and  local NGOs, agencies,  etc.

Rwanda  was  very  uncompromising  on the  lead role  to the extent that in 1995-96  the  government  had  to ask UNAMIR  II to  wind  up  and “leave  sooner  than later”.

UNAMIR II  was  only  perpetuating  dependency  on  the international community while undermining the  government’s legitimacy  by  insisting  people  remain  in camps.

Building Capacity: Given the  near-failed state  of  Rwanda, the first  thing was  to ensure security  by  integrating  and  forming a coherent  national  defense force.  From  the  ex-combatants  and the  demobilized soldiers, a new police force was formed to take  over the national policing  duties from  the  military.

The  ex-combatants also  went  on  to form  the local  defense units  in their  respective areas  of  origin.   Rwanda’s security  was  therefore locally  owned.  The policy  of integrating the military and  the  militia into a  coherent  force served  as  a role  model for  the greater society  that  had been  polarized  and  divided.
With  security  in  place it  was easier  to  start  on  building capacity  in  all the  other sectors  of  the  nation.

Economic Assessment, Aid Focus  and  Priorities:  As  already observed  Rwanda  was socio-economically  on  its knees with  the  cumulative  decline  in  GDP having  passed  the 60% by  1994.  Despite this,  immediately  after  the  genocide  aid  was not  forthcoming from  the  international community  until the  end  of 1996 when donors  under  the Geneva Conference  for  Rwanda  pledged over  US$600  million that  would be managed under  a trust  fund  by  the UNDP.

Unfortunately,  the  UNDP wanted  to  take  over  the planning function  from  the government by determining development  priorities which  came  with conditionalities to access those funds.  Additionally, the  UNHCR  returned  from Congo in  1996-97 with  a  hefty balance on their relief account  (US$1.2b) that  by  far exceeded  the  national  budget (US$500m)  of Rwanda.

At  one point cabinet ministers would line  up  at  the  UNHCR office  seeking  funds  for their ministerial  projects without  going  through  the national  treasury. This compromised  national  priorities  in economic development.

Information and Messaging: Rwanda  has  used a strategic  messaging campaign  as  an active participant  and  partner in  peace-building efforts  in  Africa.  Rwanda is currently involved  in  almost all regional  peace  initiatives, including the East  African  Standby Force.

Today, Rwanda is the 5th largest troop and Police contributor to UN peacekeeping missions, with  5,136 troops, 978 police, and 32 military observers in 6 UN Missions, including the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID); the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS); the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH); the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL); the UN Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA); and the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI).

Recently, due to the deteriorating situation in the Central African Republic (CAR), Rwanda committed to send its troops to reinforce the International support mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA).

Engagement with  fellow Africans and the international community  for sustainable  peace  and  improved  developmental remains at the  core  of  Rwanda’s foreign policy  agenda.

They are not like them

In Africa, Army reputations are of beating people, warlords without smiling faces. Civilians fear them. When they see them, they run away fearing their lives. In Rwanda,  story is totally different. Rwanda defense forces legacies are of discipline, patriotism, commitment, friendly and professionalism. Armies and the rest of population join hand in hand to make Rwanda peaceful and sovereign.

Beyond of their everyday responsibility of protecting sovereignty of the country, RDF participate in Umuganda (community work) alongside common residents. Through army week, they cure  Rwandans and do different activities on free price in line to improve the Rwandan standard of living.

The value of working together reduced a gap between people and security organs. Rwanda citizens report card (CRC2016)  indicates  that  there  is  90%  of  net  satisfaction  against  7.4%  net  dissatisfaction. An  improvement  compared  to  86.5%  reported  in  the  CRC  2015  report.

Figures show that the  National  Army  (Rwanda  Defense  Force/RDF)  is  the  most  trusted  with 99%  followed  by  the  Rwanda  National  Police  (RNP)  with  97.4%.

Peacebuilding Lessons from  Rwanda

Peacebuilding  can not be  assembled  elsewhere.  It  must be a  homegrown  process.  Local ownership is  paramount because  locals must  take  full  responsibility as they  are  the primary  stakeholders. 

Rwanda’s military  and  social  integration  process  has shown that  peacebuilding  is positive-sum  game;  there  are neither spoilers  nor  losers.  Everybody  is  a winning stakeholder  in  the post-conflict  scenario.

Rwandans must  build  local  capacity  especially  in  security  and  defence  in  order  to  usher  in peace  and  development. The capacity  built should  give us courage  to  say  “no”  to what is wrong  and  defend  what  is  right in  the eyes  of  a  paternalistic  and patronizing international community.

Conclusion

To scapegoat or externalize our problems worth nothing. Aftermath of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, Rwanda was nearly completely destroyed. Having men of valor,  they made it healthy again not because they had millions of dollars in order to put everything in place, But because of the spirit of loving the nation only.

Struggle continues, Under our visionary leader President Paul Kagame,  Rwanda aims to be an African Singapore.  But to reach the aim, It requires to own  our problems collectively,  fight for our dignity and own our country.

End

About the author

KARANGWA Janvier is a media specialist. He got Bachelor of arts in Journalism and communication from University of Rwanda, 2017.

Contacts

Email: karangwajanvier55@gmail.com
Twitter: @karangwajanvie5
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